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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Anthony L. Cianci, who pled guilty to two counts of tax 
evasion, challenges the district court's consideration of 
uncharged conduct involving the generation of the 
unreported income in applying a two-level sentencing 
enhancement for the use of sophisticated means to impede 
discovery and a two-level enhancement for abuse of a 
position of trust. Cianci also asserts ineffective assistance 






On September 9, 1997, Cianci entered a guilty plea to 
two counts of tax evasion stemming from Cianci's failure to 
report income he obtained through embezzlement and 
kickbacks on his 1989 and 1990 tax returns. During this 
time, Cianci worked for the Panasonic Company, a 
manufacturer of consumer electronics, as the General 
Manager for the Northeast group. In 1986, Cianci and his 
two co-defendants, Mark Ross, also a Panasonic executive, 
and Mark Manevitz, purchased Drake Brothers, a wholesale 
and retail distributor of Panasonic products, with Manevitz 
holding the interest of Cianci and Ross in a secret trust. 
Manevitz was the owner of record of Drake and ran its day- 
to-day affairs. Cianci and Ross used Drake to sell goods 
they embezzled from Panasonic. 
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Cianci obtained some of the income on which he failed to 
pay taxes by diverting embezzled Panasonic merchandise to 
Drake by shipping them to Drake under a "bill to/ship to" 
order by which Panasonic products were billed to one major 
distributor but shipped by Panasonic to another 
distributor. To facilitate nondisclosure of the diversion of 
the merchandise through this mechanism, Cianci 
eliminated the mailing of monthly statements to its 
distributors. As part of the scheme, Cianci created a series 
of false offsets to the accounts of the distributors who had 
been billed in the form of fictitious advertising invoices, 
diverted volume rebates, and false mark downs which 
completely eliminated the cost of the products shipped to 
Drake from the distributors' accounts. 
 
Once these goods were received by Drake, Manevitz 
transported them to independent retailers and sold them 
for cash; the transactions corresponding to the"billed 
to/shipped to" scheme were not recorded in Drake's books. 
Cianci received some of the profits and gave some to Ross. 
Manevitz was paid $1,200 per month for his participation. 
From approximately January 1989 through approximately 
December 1990, Cianci received approximately $175, 
360.81 as his share of the cash generated through the sale 
of Panasonic merchandise by Drake. 
 
Cianci received yet other money as kickbacks from 
executives at Odeon Distributors, a distributor of consumer 
electronic merchandise in New York and a customer of 
Panasonic, in return for preferential treatment in receiving 
Panasonic merchandise, which was then in high demand 
and short supply. Some of these kickbacks were in the form 
of leases of automobiles used by Cianci at the rate of 
$14,778.12 per year for the years 1989 and 1990 for a total 
of $29,556.24. In addition, Cianci received direct payments 
from Odeon and other Panasonic customers' executives in 
the form of money orders, which totaled $42,109.45. 
 
Cianci was charged with obtaining and concealing 
$247,025 in income and evading $77,123 in taxes. In 
Cianci's plea agreement, he stipulated, inter alia, that his 
base level offense should be enhanced two levels pursuant 
to S 2T1.1(b)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines for the use of 
sophisticated means to impede discovery of the offense. In 
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its draft of the PSR the probation office rejected the 
sophisticated means enhancement, and instead 
recommended a two-point abuse of a position of trust 
enhancement under S 3B1.3 that had not been mentioned 
in the plea agreement. 
 
At sentencing, the district court, applying the 1990 
Sentencing Guidelines, calculated Cianci's base offense 
level at 12. See U.S.S.G. S 1B1.11. The court increased 
Cianci's base offense level by a total of six points: two 
points for his failing to report income exceeding $10,000 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2T1.1(b)(1), two points for his use of 
sophisticated means to impede discovery of the offense 
pursuant to S 2T1.1(b)(2), and two points for his abuse of a 
position of trust pursuant to S 3B1.3. The court rejected the 
government's S 5K1.1 motion for an additional departure to 
reflect Cianci's substantial assistance to the government, 
finding "nothing of a substantial or significant means 
wherein the Government has profited from the `cooperation' 
of Mr. Cianci." App. at 61. 
 
Based upon an offense level of 16 and a criminal history 
category of I, the district court sentenced Cianci to 
concurrent 22-month terms of imprisonment, which fell at 
the lower end of the applicable 21-to-27-month range, a 
total fine of $40,000, a special assessment of $100 and a 
supervised release term of 3 years on each count, to run 








Sophisticated Means Enhancement 
 
Cianci argues that the district court erred in enhancing 
his offense level by two points pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
S 2T1.1(b)(2), because it was improperly premised upon its 
analysis of the embezzlement scheme that generated the 
income to Cianci rather than the subsequent tax evasion 
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offense to which he pled guilty. The standard of review to 
be exercised over legal questions about the meaning of the 
Sentencing Guidelines is plenary. United States v. Rudolph, 
137 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 1998). A clearly erroneous 
standard should be applied to factual determinations 
underlying the application of the Guidelines. United States 
v. Veksler, 62 F.3d 544, 550 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Under S 2T1.1(b)(2), a 2-level upward adjustment is 
warranted "[i]f sophisticated means were used to impede 
discovery of the nature or extent of the offense." U.S.S.G. 
S 2T1.1(b)(2). The commentary to S 2T1.1 states that 
"sophisticated means" includes "conduct that is more 
complex or demonstrates greater intricacy or planning than 
a routine tax-evasion case." U.S.S.G. S 2T1.1, Application 
Note 6. The Background Commentary to S 2T1.1 recognizes 
that while "tax evasion always involves some planning, 
unusually sophisticated efforts to conceal the evasion 
decrease the likelihood of detection and therefore warrant 
an additional sanction for deterrence purposes." U.S.S.G. 
S 2T1.1, Background Commentary P 4. Cianci argues that 
the district court erred in focusing its analysis on the 
sophistication of Cianci's embezzlement activities, and was 
instead required to find that he used sophisticated means 
to hide from the government the income generated from his 
embezzlement activities. 
 
Cianci's guilty plea agreement contains a stipulation that 
"[s]ophisticated means were used to impede the discovery of 
the existence or extent of the offense" and as such "the 
offense level should be increased to 17." Presentence 
Investigation Report at 10. The plea agreement contained a 
statement that "[t]o the extent that the parties do not 
stipulate, each reserves the right to argue the effect of any 
fact upon sentence." App. at 13 (emphasis added). 
 
Under the law of this circuit, Cianci cannot renege on his 
agreement. In United States v. Melendez, 55 F.3d 130 (3d 
Cir. 1995), we rejected a defendant's attempt to dispute a 
stipulation regarding the appropriate sentencing range. 
Similarly, in United States v. Parker, 874 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 
1989), we declined to allow a defendant to argue facts 
which contradicted those he agreed to in his plea 
agreement. The agreement encompassed both the number 
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of parcels taken from the mail and their value, and Parker 
had confirmed in court that was his understanding. Parker 
could not be heard to contest the value thereafter. We 
noted that in sentencing Parker the district judge used 
precisely the valuation he had stated he would use when 
Parker pleaded guilty, and Parker did not reserve the right 
to challenge the facts he had confirmed. Id. at 177-78. We 
stated that under these circumstances, we had "no 
difficulty in holding [the defendant] to the plea agreement 
for he seeks the benefits of it without the burdens." Id. at 
178. 
 
In this case, before accepting Cianci's guilty plea, the 
district court summarized the stipulations agreed to by 
Cianci, including that relating to the use of sophisticated 
means, and asked Cianci if he knew what he was doing and 
if anything was left out. See App. at 31-33. Cianci, after 
conferring with his attorney, raised no objections. As the 
sophisticated means enhancement Cianci received was 
exactly what he stipulated to, we here also conclude that 
the district court was justified in holding Cianci to his 
stipulation that he used "sophisticated means" to impede 
the offense. 
 
Even if we were inclined to look beyond Cianci's 
stipulation, there is adequate support for the district 
court's finding that Cianci employed sophisticated means to 
conceal his tax evasion from the IRS. Cianci did much more 
than merely conceal relatively open transactions. He 
established an elaborate scheme which involved the use of 
a shell corporation, falsified documents, and failure to 
record cash payments. According to the Guidelines, a 
sophisticated means enhancement would be applicable 
where the defendant used offshore bank accounts or 
engaged in transactions through corporate shells. U.S.S.G. 
S 2T1.1, Application Note 6; see also United States v. 
Furkin, 119 F.3d 1276, 1285 (7th Cir. 1997) (failing to keep 
records concerning income and using cash transactions are 
indicia of sophisticated means). 
 
Admittedly, the methods devised by Cianci impeded 
discovery by Panasonic of his embezzlement, but they also 
facilitated concealment of the income derived from the 
embezzlement and thereby the necessity to report it to the 
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government and pay taxes on it. Moreover, some of the 
methods used by Cianci were independent of the 
embezzlement, such as his acceptance of a car leased for 
him by Odeon and payments in the form of money orders 
to impede discovery of his kickback income. 
 
Also, as the government points out, had Cianci been 
motivated only to conceal the embezzlement from 
Panasonic, there would have been no reason to take the 
intricate steps to conceal the transactions on Drake's 
books, as those books were not available to Panasonic. 
However, they would have been available to the IRS and the 
absence of full and accurate records facilitated concealment 
from the government. 
 
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the district 





Enhancement for Abuse of a Position of Trust 
 
Cianci's other objection to his sentence is to the two-level 
enhancement imposed by the court upon finding that 
Cianci "abused a position of trust" under U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3 
(1990). Under S 3B1.3, "[i]f the defendant abused a position 
of public or private trust . . . in a manner that significantly 
facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, 
increase by 2 levels." U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3. The notes 
accompanying this section state that "[t]he position of trust 
must have contributed in some substantial way to 
facilitating the crime and not merely have provided an 
opportunity that could as easily have been afforded to other 
persons." U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3, Application Note 1. Cianci 
argues that the district court improperly premised its 
conclusion upon facts unrelated to the tax evasion offense 
to which he pled guilty. 
 
Generally, determining whether the district court 
employed an erroneous legal theory in finding that a 
defendant held and abused a position of trust is a legal 
question subject to de novo review. See United States v. 
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Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1250 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing United 
States v. Craddoch, 993 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 1993)). In 
this case, however, Cianci made no objection to this 
adjustment at the district court level, so we review the 
ruling only for plain error. See United States v. Carr, 25 
F.3d 1194, 1209 (3d Cir. 1994). To establish plain error, 
Cianci must show that the district court committed error, 
that the error was "obvious" and "clear under current law," 
that the error "affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings," United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), 
and that it "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings," Johnson v. United 
States, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997) (quotations omitted). 
 
Cianci must first show that error in fact occurred. See 
Johnson, 117 S.Ct. at 1549. Cianci does not argue that he 
could not be found to have abused a position of trust with 
Panasonic, where he was a high-ranking official, and used 
the discretion vested in him to generate the income that he 
failed to report for taxes. Instead he argues that Panasonic 
was not the victim of tax evasion, which was the offense of 
conviction, and that he had no trust relationship with the 
government or Internal Revenue Service. The government 
responds that Cianci's abuse of his position of trust with 
Panasonic is relevant conduct which may be considered for 
this purpose. 
 
This court has not previously decided whether the 
sentencing court may consider uncharged conduct in 
applying the abuse of a position of trust enhancement. In 
United States v. Bhagavan, 116 F.3d 189 (7th Cir. 1997), 
the Seventh Circuit squarely held that it may. Id. at 193. In 
Bhagavan, the defendant, president and largest shareholder 
of a small engineering and surveying firm, was convicted of 
tax evasion arising from his diversion of a substantial 
amount of money nominally due the firm into his personal 
bank accounts and failure to report the money as income 
on his personal or the firm's tax returns. Id. at 190-91. The 
court, over one dissent, held that the defendant occupied a 
position of trust vis-a-vis the minority shareholders, who 
were victims of the defendant's scheme to enrich himself 
and avoid paying taxes on the secret income. Affirmance of 
the enhancement entailed rejection of the notion, inherent 
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in Bhagavan's argument, that the United States can be the 
only victim of a tax evasion scheme. Id. at 193. 
 
The contrary view was taken in United States v. Barakat, 
130 F.3d 1448 (11th Cir. 1997), where the Eleventh Circuit 
held that an enhancement for the abuse of the position of 
trust could be justified only if the abuse was connected to 
the offense of conviction. Id. at 1455. The Barakat court did 
not give any explanation for its holding that the word 
"offense" in S 3B1.3, which requires that the defendant's 
abuse of trust "significantly facilitate the commission or 
concealment of the offense," must be read as"offense of 
conviction" in order to maintain consistency with the 
definition of relevant conduct in S 1B1.3(a). Id. The court 
ruled that an enhancement was improper because it would 
"broaden the crime of tax evasion to include the manner in 
which the income was obtained." Id. 
 
Cianci calls to our attention United States v. Broderson, 
67 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 1995), cited in the dissenting opinion 
in Bhagavan. Although the court there disallowed the 
abuse of a position of trust enhancement, the factual 
situation was far different. Broderson was a vice president 
of Grumman Data Systems Corporation who negotiated a 
multi-million dollar contract with NASA for a 
supercomputer. He ultimately negotiated a lower interest 
rate on the financing than originally quoted but failed to 
inform NASA, as required under the applicable statute and 
regulation. Following his conviction of various counts of 
fraudulent conduct directed at the United States 
government, the district court added the two-level 
enhancement for abuse of a position of trust. The court of 
appeals reversed, holding that Broderson did not occupy a 
position of trust vis-a-vis the government. Id. at 455-56. 
 
There was no discussion by the Broderson court nor 
could there have been about the relevance of any abuse of 
trust vis-a-vis Broderson's employer because there was no 
such abuse. Broderson did not profit personally nor did he 
victimize his employer. Quite the contrary, the opinion 
makes clear that Broderson acted so that Grumman, which 
was in financial difficulty, would have the benefit of the 
extra funds. Id. at 455, 459. In addition, the appellate court 
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noted that the enhancement was inapplicable because it 
was already included in the base offense. Id. at 455. 
 
In contrast, Cianci's conduct vis-a-vis his employer was 
characterized by the same type of abuse of a trust 
relationship that led us to hold such an enhancement 
fitting in United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 
1992). As we stated in United States v. Hickman, 991 F.2d 
1110 (3d Cir. 1993), "[t]o abuse a position of trust, a 
defendant must, by definition, have taken criminal 
advantage of a trust relationship between himself and his 
victim." Id. at 1112. Admittedly, the employer-victim here 
was not the victim of the offense of conviction, but no 
language in the applicable sentencing guideline so 
circumscribes the enhancement. 
 
Consideration of the trust relationship with the victim for 
purposes of the enhancement is consistent with the 
treatment of "relevant conduct" in the Guidelines. In our 
recent decision in United States v. Rudolph, 137 F.3d 173 
(3d Cir. 1998), we rejected the defendant's claim that 
uncharged conduct is not "relevant conduct" under the 
Guidelines. Id. at 177. Although S 3B1.1 was amended in 
1991 to clarify that the "offense" means the offense of 
conviction and all relevant conduct under S 1B1.3, unless a 
different meaning is specified or is otherwise clear from the 
context, relevant conduct was also a relevant consideration 
under the 1990 Guidelines which governed Cianci's 
sentence. Section 1B1.2(b) instructed the sentencing judge, 
"[a]fter determining the appropriate offense guideline 
section pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, determine 
the applicable guideline range in accordance with S 1B1.3 
(Relevant Conduct)." U.S.S.G. S 1B1.2(b). In further 
commentary, the Sentencing Commission instructed that 
"[i]n many instances, it will be appropriate that the court 
consider the actual conduct of the offender, even when 
such conduct does not constitute an element of the 
offense." U.S.S.G. S 1B1.2, Application Note 3. Included 
among the instances for consideration of relevant conduct 
is the court's determination of "various adjustments." Id. 
Indeed, the Background Commentary accompanying the 
Relevant Conduct section states that "[c]onduct that is not 
formally charged or is not an element of the offense of 
 
                                10 
  
conviction may enter into the determination of the 
applicable Guideline sentencing range." U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3, 
Background Commentary P 1. Thus, any suggestion by 
Cianci that relevant conduct could not be considered in 
adjusting his base offense level is plainly wrong. 
 
The 1990 Guidelines are explicit in authorizing 
consideration of "all acts and omissions committed or aided 
and abetted by the defendant, or for which the defendant 
would be otherwise accountable, that occurred during the 
commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for 
that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid 
detection or responsibility for that offense, or that otherwise 
were in furtherance of that offense," when determining 
whether to apply Chapter Three adjustments. U.S.S.G. 
S 1B1.3(a)(1). The Application Notes accompanying this 
section state that conduct "for which the defendant would 
be otherwise accountable" includes "conduct that the 
defendant counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or 
willfully caused." U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3, Application Note 1. It 
follows that Cianci's abuse of his position of trust with 
Panasonic by conducting the complex transactions that 
facilitated his uncharged criminal conduct leading to his 
receipt of the income he failed to report may properly be 
considered as relevant conduct.1 
 
It would be contrary to the scheme of the Sentencing 
Guidelines to restrict the concept of "relevant conduct." An 
article written by the former Chairman and General 
Counsel of the Sentencing Commission refers to the 
relevant conduct section as the "cornerstone" of the 
Guidelines. William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, 
Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 495, 496 (1990). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Cianci argues that our decision in United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78 
(3d Cir. 1992), supports his contention that relevant conduct was 
improperly considered in enhancing his sentence. That case merely 
reflects the rule that relevant conduct is not properly considered when 
a particular guideline contains a more explicit instruction, see S 1B1.3, 
Background Commentary P 2 (1990), and held relevant conduct would 
not be considered in applying a S 3B1.1(a) enhancement for that reason. 
See Pollen, 978 F.2d at 88. There is no similar language to preclude the 
consideration of relevant conduct in S 3B1.3 at issue here. 
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Other commentators have noted that the Guidelines 
required "the sentencing courts to base the sentence on all 
conduct relevant to the offense of conviction." Roger W. 
Haines, Jr., Kevin Cole & Jennifer C. Woll, Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines Handbook 49 (1991 ed.). In light of 
the above, we conclude there was no plain error in 





Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
Finally, Cianci urges this court to vacate his sentence 
because the representation he received from his trial 
counsel at sentencing was allegedly ineffective. Specifically, 
Cianci asserts that his trial counsel was insufficiently 
familiar with the Sentencing Guidelines as they applied to 
him. 
 
This court "has long followed the practice of declining to 
consider a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on direct appeal." United States v. Cocivera, 104 
F.3d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding the issue more 
appropriate for collateral attack); see United States v. 
Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505, 512 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating 
preference that ineffective assistance of counsel be raised in 
collateral proceeding); United States v. Oliva, 46 F.3d 320, 
325 (3d Cir. 1995) (declining to address ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal). 
 
We will therefore dismiss that portion of Cianci's appeal 







For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
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